

Gender inequalities in labour markets in Central Asia

Draft for discussion

Tamar Khitarishvili¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union has initiated an unprecedented social and economic transformation of the Central Asian economies. Their experience has demonstrated that the changes in the gender balance triggered by economic shifts are far from obvious. Whereas during the Soviet years, women in Central Asia experienced considerable advances in economic and social well-being, during the post-Soviet period these advances were in many cases reversed, in part due to the economic shifts experienced by countries in the region, including private sector growth and significant migration flows, and to some degree due to the strengthening of patriarchal traditions. This paper establishes the current state of various dimensions of gender inequalities and their past dynamics in the five countries of Central Asia and proposes steps aimed at reducing them to advance inclusive growth, decent job creation and economic empowerment.

¹ Research Scholar, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, khitaris@levy.org, 1 845 758 7714; paper prepared for the joint UNDP/ILO conference on Employment, Trade and Human Development in Central Asia (Almaty, Kazakhstan, June 23-24, 2016).

Background


The Central Asian countries² represent a heterogeneous group that includes energy-exporting countries (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan); agriculture-dependent small economies (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); and the more industrialized economy of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have the largest populations, at over 30 and 17 million, followed by Tajikistan with over eight million, and Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan with almost six million each. Kazakhstan is the most well-off Central Asian country with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of \$20,867, and Tajikistan the poorest with GNI per capita of \$2,517 (UNDP 2015).

Based on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Central Asian region is characterized by moderate levels of gender inequality (Figure 1). According to the GII, which gauges reproductive health and gender gaps in empowerment and economic status, the region performs better than the world average on measures of gender equality (Table A1). This is largely driven by relatively strong gender indicators in education and below average maternal mortality rates (even though they remain considerable). A similar conclusion emerges using the GDI, which gauges gender gaps in human development achievements focusing on health, education and living standards and places the Central Asia countries above the world average (Table A2).

However, a more careful look at the components of the GDI reveals that this picture appears to be an outcome of low human development indicators, such as below average life expectancy, for men in particular, and relatively low levels of gender-disaggregated estimated gross national income per capita (with the exception of natural-resource-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Despite not having corresponding values of GDI and GII due to data limitations, Turkmenistan stands out as the Central Asian country with the lowest life expectancy for women and men and the lowest expected years of schooling. On the other hand, Kazakhstan appears to perform much better than its fellow Central Asian countries. As a result, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country classified by UNDP as a country with high level of human development whereas the other four countries of the region fall into the medium human development category (UNDP 2015).

² The Central Asian region includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Figure 1. Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Inequality Index (GII).



GDI: more equal = closer to 1

GII: more equal = closer to 0

source: UNDP (2015)


Labour markets

Gender gaps in labour markets appear already at the level of labour force participation (Figure 2). Although labour force participation rates in Central Asia have not considerably changed over the last 20 years, gender dynamics have varied, especially with respect to movements in women’s labour force participation. For example, in Kazakhstan, the male labour force participation rate increased slightly from 81.9 in 1991 to 82.4 in 2013 but the female participation rate rose faster from 70.1 in 1991 to 75.1 percent in 2013, contracting the gender gap.³ On the other hand, in Kyrgyzstan, the participation rate of men also increased, from 78.1 percent in 1991 to 82.5 percent in 2013, while women’s rates fell from 64.5 percent in 1991 to 59.6 percent in 2013, widening the gap (Gender Statistics Database). In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, both male and female labour force participation rates have hardly changed, although there are indications of a widening gap due to a slight increase in men’s participation rates without an accompanying increase in women’s rates.

It is notable that male participation rates across Central Asian countries are similar (and is the slight increase in this rate) while there is considerable variation in female labour force participation rates, from only 46.9 percent in Turkmenistan to 67.7 percent in Kazakhstan (2013). As a result, the gender gap in labour force participation in the Central Asian region varies from about 10.2 percentage points in Kazakhstan to 30 percentage points in Turkmenistan.

³ Source: WB Gender Statistics, series SL_TLF_ACTI_MA_ZS

Figure 2. Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender.



Source: Gender Statistics Database.

There are differences in gender gaps between rural and urban areas. The gap is small in Kazakhstan, where in 2014, it was 11.3 percentage points in rural areas and 11.1 percent in urban areas (KAZ, Economically Active Population, 2015). In Kyrgyzstan, in 2011 it was 25.1 percentage points in rural areas and 21.7 percentage points in urban areas (Women and Men). In Tajikistan, in 2007, the gender gap was 26.6 percentage points in rural areas and 27.9 percentage points in urban areas (Women and Men).


There are also substantial differences in participation rates across age categories that influence the gender gap. Among those 15-24 years old, labour force participation rates are substantially lower than among older cohorts and, unlike the older cohorts, the youth female labour force participation rate has consistently declined in all countries of Central Asia (Figure 3). Even in Kazakhstan, the only Central Asian country with an increase in female labour force participation rates since the 1990s, the youth female rate fell from 48.9 percent in 1991 to 44.4 percent in 2013. But this can be attributed to more women going for higher education: the decrease was accompanied by a rise in the ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment from 114.1 in 1999 to 129.5 in 2013. On the other hand in Uzbekistan the ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment fell from 82.4 in 1999 to 64.7 in 2011.

Furthermore, evidence points to the resurgence in the practice of early marriage in Central Asian regions affected by migration, hindering educational and labour market prospects of young women. In Uzbekistan, in 2005, 22.1 percent of marriages involved women 19 years old or younger (State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, 2007). In Tajikistan in 2006, among 20-49-year-old women, about 13 percent were married before the age of 15 (MICS). Nevertheless, there appears to be an overall

downward trend as this proportion was only five percent among 15-19-year-old women. Among young male workers, unusually low labour force participation rates have been attributed to a strong discouraged worker effect, as evidence from Tajikistan suggests (Falkingham and Baschieri 2004).


As women enter child-bearing years, the gender gap in labour force participation tends to widen due to domestic and care burdens (Maltseva 2007). As many as 61 percent of Tajik women not in the labour force cite domestic responsibilities as the reason for their inactivity (Figure 13). At 11 percent, this share is much lower in Kazakhstan, possibly due to the better state of social infrastructure provisioning.

Figure 3. Labour force participation rates of working age individuals and youth, by gender



Except for Tajikistan, women tend to have higher unemployment rates than men. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the high labour force participation rates are associated with relatively low unemployment rates but a considerable gender gap favouring men (Figure 4). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, although female labour force participation rates are very low, the gender gap in the unemployment rate is less than one percentage point. This implies that although proportionately fewer women than men are in the labour force, the shares of men and women looking for jobs are very similar.


Figure 4. Unemployment rates, by gender.



Source: Gender Statistics

Gender gaps in employment largely mirror the gaps in labour force participation rates (Figure 5). They are the lowest in Kazakhstan at 11.2 percentage points and the highest in Turkmenistan at 26.9 percentage points. The analysis of the employment composition by type and sector of the economy sheds additional light on country-level differences.

Figure 5. Employment rates, by gender.




Source: Gender Statistics


In particular, larger gender gaps in the employment rate are observed in the countries with a lower share of wage employment. This implies that the gender gaps in employment rates may be driven primarily

by the forces influencing self-employment and that wage employment generates more gender-equal outcomes. If so, understanding the factors that contribute to the expansion of wage employment in the Central Asian region may also yield insights into contracting gender gaps in the employment rate, as can the understanding of the reasons for the presence of large gender inequalities among the self-employed.

Indeed, wage employment is a considerably more dominant form of employment in Kazakhstan, which has better overall gender indicators compared to other Central Asian countries, with a wage employment share of over 60 percent among both men and women, followed by Tajikistan with about 53 percent and Kyrgyzstan with the share that varies between 47 and 48 percent (Figure 6). On the other hand, there are gender gaps among different categories of the self-employed. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, more women are contributing family workers than men, reflecting a general pattern in which women are more likely to be involved in unpaid activities.

Figure 6. Type of employment composition, by gender.







Source: Gender Statistics; Note: no data available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

At least to some degree, these country- and gender-based differences in the composition of employment are linked to the sectoral structure of the Central Asian economies (Figure 7). More than a quarter of the employed population in this region is employed in agriculture and, except for Kazakhstan, the share of agricultural employment among women is very close to or higher than this share among men. The gender gap is particularly striking in Tajikistan, in which 75.1 percent of women work in the agricultural sector compared to 41.8 percent of men.

Figure 7. Industrial composition of employment, by gender.



The high proportions of contributing family workers in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan appear to be tied to the predominance of relatively small-plot based agriculture, in which women tend to participate. In particular, 16.9 percent and 19.1 percent of female workers and 8.9 percent and 12.5 percent of male workers in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, are contributing family workers. On the other hand, in Kazakhstan, despite more than a third of workers employed in agriculture, less than two percent of both male and female workers are contributing family workers, likely due to the larger-scale nature of agriculture, especially in the northern part of Kazakhstan. Indeed, Petrick et al. (2013) argue that large-scale farming based on hired labour will continue to be the main mode of land cultivation for the foreseeable future in the Kazakh grain region.

High shares of own-account workers in the overall employment are also linked to non-agricultural private sector development although gender patterns vary by country. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, proportionately more men are own-account workers. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, 34.7 percent of female workers as opposed to 30.5 percent of male workers are own-account workers. Although data from Turkmenistan is limited, ILO (2010) indicates that self-employment in Turkmenistan is female-dominated with 62 percent of self-employed individuals being women. Further, linked to gender gaps in the private sector development and entrepreneurship is the higher share of employers among men compared to women (Figure 6). For example, in Kazakhstan, proportionately twice as many men as women were employers in 2013 (1.1 percent of employed women and 2.5 percent of employed men). Expressed in other terms, only 15 percent of employers in Tajikistan and 30 percent of employers in Turkmenistan are female (ILO 2010; World Bank 2013).

As useful as these labour force classifications are, they may not accurately represent labour force participation. For example, the boundary between inactivity and unemployment reported in household budget and in labour force surveys can be very blurry, especially for rural women. Moreover, these classifications do not necessarily reflect the quality of the engagement in labour force. For example, agricultural employment tends to be concentrated in low-productivity subsistence activities and, among females in particular, is dominated by contributing family workers who are unpaid. Furthermore, a large share of agricultural production takes place informally, without any social protection, and the same applies to the non-agricultural private sector. On the other hand, informal activities may provide better remuneration and higher standards of living than employment in the formal sector. Indeed, despite its relative stability and social benefits, public sector employment is typically poorly remunerated. These distinctions are important and we address their gender dimensions in Central Asia in the context of rural development, agriculture and private sector development.

Rural development and agriculture

Close to half of the population in Central Asia lives in rural areas, as much as 66 percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan and 55 percent of the population in Turkmenistan. Over the last two decades, this proportion has been consistently declining. For example, whereas in 2007 about 64.2 percent of the population in Uzbekistan lived in rural areas, by 2011 this proportion dropped to 48.8 percent (Stulina and Torguzova; ILO 2010), with both internal and external migration contributing to the decline. Indeed, migration from and within Central Asia has transformed the labour market landscape of rural areas in particular, with complex consequences for families and communities left behind, as discussed in the migration section of the paper.

Women hold a large share of agricultural employment. This share in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is 54 percent and 53 percent, respectively (FAO Gender and Land Rights Database⁴). Similarly in Uzbekistan, it is 53 percent of total agricultural employment (Alimdjanova 2009). However, women are underrepresented among workers responsible for decision-making, such as specialists and managers, and tend to be concentrated in seasonal and unskilled jobs. Whereas the female share in overall wage employment in agriculture is about 25 percent (TC ICWC 2006), among unskilled wage workers this share is higher and varies between 36.7 percent in Kyrgyzstan and 59.3 percent in Tajikistan. WECF (2014) gives an even higher estimate of 80 percent in Tajikistan. On the other hand, the female share of specialists in Tajikistan is below 16 percent (it is zero in Turkmenistan) and among farm managers it is only 12 percent. In Uzbekistan, only 4.2 percent of managerial positions in agriculture are held by women (ADB 2014). In sum, despite their considerable presence in agriculture, women in Central Asia are concentrated in low-skilled jobs with little decision-making power.

In addition to employment, there are strong gender asymmetries in agriculture in land ownership and lease holdings. Although laws generally do not discriminate against women, in reality, women rarely hold land titles, reflecting strong patriarchal customs and attitudes.⁵ Women typically have lower awareness of land reform processes and legislation, and of their rights to land. As a result, only 17.1 percent of farm owners in Tajikistan in 2007 and 12.4 percent of land holders in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 were women (FAO 2011). In Uzbekistan, only 7.2 percent of leasehold farms were led by women (Alimdjanova 2009). This situation restricts female-owned micro and small businesses in agriculture due to women's inability to obtain credit without collateral. Importantly, gender norms have a direct impact on the

⁴ This database does not include data on Kazakhstan.

⁵ Land ownership laws vary by country. In Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, land can be privately owned and is transferable. In Turkmenistan, private farmers get land use rights, but land ownership is not transferable. In Uzbekistan, there is no private land ownership (FAO Gender and Land Database).

sustenance and well-being of families. For example, families with only daughters have received less land during the distribution of land use rights in Uzbekistan (FAO Gender and Land Database).

Gender disparities in land ownership and the difficulties of transferring ownership to women present particular problems in female-headed households with migrant male members, rendering them unable to participate in critical land transactions, such as renting or mortgaging land. Indeed, migration from and within Central Asia has considerably disrupted the gender population balance in rural areas. In some rural communities, up to 90 percent of adult male population has migrated.

The restrictions on land access are also translated into water access challenges because membership in water users' associations is commonly linked to land ownership (World Bank 2014). Water irrigation issues are particularly challenging among individual and family *dehkan* farms, which employ proportionately more women (Alimdjanova 2009). Yet, evidence from Tajikistan suggests that fewer women participate in decision-making in individual or family *dehkan* farms than in large collective farms. For example, in Khatlon and Sughd regions of Tajikistan, TJICCA data indicate that women participate in decision-making for farming decisions, such as the choice of a crop or the sale of agricultural produce, in less than 25 percent of the households and this is especially the case among small farms. Even in large farms, women have little bargaining power and are trapped in low-wage, low-productivity work. It is remarkable that this picture is prevalent even among female-headed households, indicating that male extended family members continue making decisions with respect to farming (World Bank 2014). Hence, land and water access restrictions contribute to gender gaps in the quality of employment.

Such a situation also contributes to low-productivity agricultural practices among female-headed farms, affecting their living standards. Women-headed households are less likely to adopt sustainable land management practices, especially in small farms, to some degree because these women tend to have relatively weak knowledge-sharing networks. Conditional on having knowledge, on the other hand, they are as likely to adopt sustainable land management practices as male-headed farm households (World Bank 2014). This finding emphasizes the importance of disentangling the complex factors that underlie gender gaps in agricultural productivity.

Another factor influencing agricultural productivity is plot size. Similar to nonagricultural enterprises, in the agricultural sector, women tend to own and manage smaller land plots than men. In Tajikistan, in 2007 the average plot size was 0.22 acres in female-headed (not necessarily female owned) farms/households and 0.37 acres in male-headed households (Women and Men in Tajikistan, p.18). These numbers are consistent with data based on land ownership. In Tajikistan, in 2007 the average size of female-owned land plots (based on official ownership documents) was 0.27 acres as opposed to 0.31 acres

for male-owned plots (Kieran et al. 2015). In Kyrgyzstan, the overall female share in land holdings is 12.4 percent, but only 5.5 percent of farms with 100-1000 hectares of arable land were female held and women held only 5.4 percent of the total land area (FAO Gender and Land Rights Database).

This picture of gender disparities in rural areas and in agriculture in Central Asia reveals that women are more likely to engage in low-value-added agricultural production compared to men. Similar to non-agricultural sectors, women operate on a smaller scale compared to men. Moreover, in countries with a small share of wage employment in agriculture, women are more likely to work as contributing family workers. For these countries, in particular, the challenge lies in improving income-earning opportunities of women. Impact evaluation studies indicate that female farmers in countries with small-scale agriculture benefit from an integrated suite of services that targets production, marketing, and social constraints and from the creation of farmer groups and collectives to establish and strengthen networks (Buvinić et al. 2013). Providing female-targeted agricultural education services and training in the use of modern agricultural inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers) and livestock has also been found to be a promising avenue for raising the productivity of female farming (USAID 2013). Finally, improving the access of women to credit by providing alternative financing mechanism and land tenure by providing legal advice and information on land tenure arrangements can help in alleviating the barriers encountered by women.

Entrepreneurship and private sector development

For lasting impact on gender inequalities in the labour markets of Central Asian economies, agricultural sector reforms have to take place in conjunction with shifts in the structure of private sector employment. Private sector expansion has led to more self-employment and is viewed as key to generating robust employment growth (World Bank 2014). The current share of the private sector in GDP ranges from only 25 percent in Turkmenistan to 75 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic.


Male shares in private employment are higher than female shares in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, likely due to the stronger representation of women in the public sector of these countries, which incidentally contributes to the considerable gender wage gaps in the Central Asian region. In Tajikistan, the female share in the private sector is higher than male share, reflecting the very high proportion of women employed in agriculture (Figure 8).

The growing role of the private sector can be viewed as indicative of the expansion in economic opportunities. It can also reflect a coping response to poor labour market conditions, reflected in high proportions of own-account and contributing family workers in most countries of Central Asia. What is clear, however, is that a large share of small and medium enterprise and own-account business activity in


these countries occurs in the informal sector, especially in agriculture. According to Schneider et al. (2010), in 2006 the size of the informal economy in Central Asian countries was around 40 percent. In 2007, 36 percent of wage workers and 47 percent of all employed individuals in Tajikistan worked in the informal sector, with the majority being women (World Bank 2013). This indicates the considerable magnitude of informal activities among the self-employed in Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan, informal sector employs about 14 percent of workforce, among whom 57 percent are female (ILO, 2010). In Kyrgyzstan the female share in informal employment in 2009 was 36.2 percent men whereas it was 41.7 percent for total employment, likely reflecting the stronger position of women in formal public-sector employment (Laboursta). It is notable that, although informal activities often represent a coping strategy to address the lack of employment opportunities in the formal sector and its high costs due to regulations and corruption, evidence appears to suggest that informal activities are nevertheless a preferred option to migration. Indeed, Abdulloev et al. (2012) argue that migration is often the last-resort coping strategy, finding, for example, that, unlike professional workers, low-skilled workers in Tajikistan are more likely to migrate than to be informally employed.

Women employed informally in agriculture are primarily engaged in the sale of agricultural produce grown on own garden plots. Women in informal nonagricultural activities, in turn, are engaged in garment production, shuttle trade and local market trade (Ishkanian 2003; ADB Uzbekistan Gender Assessment; ADB Tajikistan Gender Assessment). For example, ADB (2014) reports that between 70 and 80 percent of bazaar vendors and 50 percent of bazaar-based shuttle traders in Uzbekistan are female. There also appears to be a gender pattern with respect to the direction of trade as female shuttle traders are much more likely to shuttle to and from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan than to Kazakhstan (ADB 2014). These patterns reflect the often precarious nature of private sector employment in the region.

Figure 8. Private Shares in GDP and Employment



source: EBRD Struct and Instl Change Indic, data for 2010



source: UNECE database

■ female ■ male

The presence of a large informal economy does not necessarily rule out the presence of strong entrepreneurial elements in the private sector growth. In Kazakhstan, the established business ownership rate⁶ is 7.4 percent and the entrepreneurial intention rate⁷ is 3.9 percent (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey). The corresponding rates were 7.3 and 8.1 percent and 16 and 2.4 for Georgia and Russia, respectively, the only other former Soviet countries in which the survey was conducted. By comparison, in the United Kingdom, these rates were 6.5 and 6.3 percent. Hence, the established business ownership rate, in particular, suggests comparable levels of entrepreneurial activity. However, during the last decade, about 28 percent of formal entrepreneurial activity in Kazakhstan was necessity-driven, compared to only 16 percent in the United Kingdom. This compares to the 2006–2014 average of 30 percent in Russia and the 2014 value of 49 percent in Georgia. The key question remains whether the entrepreneurial intention and activity, even when necessity-driven, can become a seedbed for innovation and job growth and whether women can play a prominent role in this process.

Indeed, women can play different functions in entrepreneurship. As firm owners, their ownership participation rates in the Central Asian countries currently stand at about one-third or higher (Figure 9). They have increased over the last decade. For example, in 2005, the female share varied from only 14.4


⁶ Business ownership rate is the percentage of the population aged 18–64 who are currently an owner-manager of an established business, i.e., owning and managing a running business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than 42 months.

⁷ Entrepreneurial intention rate is percentage of the population aged 18–64—individuals involved in any stage of entrepreneurial activity excluded—who are latent entrepreneurs and who intend to start a business within three years.

percent in Tajikistan to 29.4 in Kazakhstan. In the same year, the female share in enterprise ownership was 11.2 percent in Turkmenistan (UNDP 2008). However, by 2013, the rates varied from 28.3 in Kazakhstan to 49.4 percent in Kyrgyzstan, in line or higher than the OECD average of about 30 percent (OECD 2012).

There was a pronounced increase in the female ownership rate during 2008 and 2009, perhaps due to the high turnover of firms in these countries. However, the sharp increase in 2008 and 2009 across the board may also be due to the disproportionately strong impact of the recession on male-dominated industries, such as construction and transport, which reduced the number of male-owned businesses.

Figure 9. Percentage of Firms with Female Ownership and Female Top Manager



Whereas female ownership rates are relatively high, the proportions of being a top manager are much lower (Figure 9), especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Top managers exert strong influence on the daily operations of firms as well their long-term development. In some cases, the female share in top management may be a better indicator of female participation in decision-making than the female share in ownership. In Tajikistan in 2013, 32.7 percent of firms had female participation in ownership but only 9.6 percent had a female top manager. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, 29.2 percent of firms had female participation in ownership but only 13.4 percent had a female top manager. It is noteworthy that despite the decrease in the proportion of firms with female ownership after the recession, in Kyrgyzstan and, to some extent, in Uzbekistan, the percentage of firms with female top managers increased and in the Kyrgyz case reached

one-third of managers of formal SMEs in 2013. This indicates the increased involvement of women in the formal private sector in Kyrgyzstan.⁸

Reflecting typical industrial segregation patterns, there is considerable variation in the female ownership share by industry. For example, in 2005, the economy-wide female share of managers was 27.3 percent, it was above average in the healthcare, education and culture sectors at 36.1, 45.7, and 44.6 percent of firms, respectively (Women and Men in Uzbekistan 2005, p.123). In addition, women are more than proportionately represented in retail trade, food and garments production in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (WB Enterprise Surveys). This is also confirmed by the findings of the female entrepreneurship survey in Uzbekistan (UNECE 2009) and in Turkmenistan (UNDP 2008).

Importantly, there are large regional differences in the female ownership share. In Kyrgyzstan, the proportion of female managers varied from 24.5 percent in Batken region to 55 percent in Bishkek region (which incidentally also had a lower gender wage gap than the average for Kyrgyzstan) (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan). In Uzbekistan, it varied from only 9.7 percent in Andijan region to 37.9 percent in Namangan region (Women and Men in Uzbekistan 2005, p. 125.).


Female-managed firms differ from male-managed firms in a number of ways. Female-owned firms tend to be smaller than male-owned firms, typical of the gender differences in firm size across the transition region. For example, in Kazakhstan the average firm size of male-owned firms is 50 workers, compared to 30 workers in female-owned firms. Yet, female-owned businesses tend to have greater scale economies due to the industries in which they predominate, which suggests that they would benefit from expansion more than male-managed firms. The smaller size of female-managed firms is largely responsible for their weaker financial performance (Sattar 2012). From the point of view of shrinking gender gaps in employment rates, it is notable that female-managed firms tend to hire proportionately more full-time female workers. For example, in 2013 in Uzbekistan, 59.9 percent percent of full-time workers in firms with female participation in ownership were female compared to 23.9 percent in firms without female participation in ownership. Findings of the female entrepreneurship survey indicate that female employment share in these firms is 68 percent in Uzbekistan (UNECE 2009). Similar relationships hold in other Central Asian countries.

⁸ Other sources confirm these estimates of female managerial engagement in the private sector, but also indicate that they tend to be below the female shares in the management of state and municipal (self-government) entities, highlighting a more active female engagement in the public sector. For example, whereas in 2011 23.7 percent of enterprises in the Kyrgyz Republic had female managers, the female share was 23.6 percent for private enterprises (in line with the evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys), 21.1 percent in state entities and reached 34.1 percent in municipal (self-government) entities (Women and Men in the Kyrgyz Republic, p.97). In Kazakhstan in 2010, 25.6 percent of enterprises had female managers, and this proportion was 24.6 percent in private enterprises, 18.8 percent in foreign enterprises, and as high as 38.2 percent in state enterprises (Women and men in Kazakhstan, 2011, p. 98).

Some obstacles that women face in setting up and running their businesses have to do with the lack of networks and expertise to navigate the “racketeer and corrupt public officials” (Ishkanian 2003), which explains women’s engagement in informal and small-scale activities that require low initial capital. Female networks tend to be less useful than male networks for business development (Welter et al. 2006). Women also face greater regulatory barriers and lack business knowledge relative to men (Sattar 2012).

Access to credit is another factor that may hinder the establishment and growth of female-owned businesses. Female entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan cite access to credit as a key barrier to expansion, rather depending on limited savings or the network of family and friends. Only 40 percent of the surveyed female entrepreneurs in Samarkand and 54 percent in Tashkent sought credit from commercial banks. Out of the women who sought credit, only 38.2 percent in Samarkand and 78 percent in Tashkent received it (UNECE 2009). Furthermore, borrowing money to start, operate or expand a farm or a business is relatively rare in Central Asian countries, especially among women, with fewer than 8 percent of individuals reporting having done so (Figure 10; Global Findex survey, 2014). Women also tend to be more risk averse than men, potentially contributing to the gender gap in business-related borrowing, although the evidence linking women’s risk aversion to the smaller size of operations is inconclusive (Sattar 2012).

Figure 10. Proportion of Individuals Who Borrowed to Start, Operate, or Expand a Farm or Business



More work is needed to understand why women are less likely to establish firms with employees, be larger in size, and function in the formal sector compared to men and, more generally, how to turn necessity entrepreneurship into opportunity entrepreneurship. Access to credit, weaker networks, and the lack of business knowledge are some of the constraints that female-headed businesses face. Alleviating these constraints can increase the potential for employment growth via the expansion of female-owned

businesses. Indeed, impact evaluation studies suggest a strong positive effect of business and financial literacy programs on the performance of female-owned businesses. These studies also suggest the importance of utilizing multi-pronged methods. For example, providing financial capital alone has impact on the performance of female-owned businesses when combined with income-generation training and follow-up activities (Buvinić et al. 2013). Moreover, larger sized female-owned businesses benefit from in-kind capital injections because they are more likely to be invested in the business (Buvinić et al. 2013). The expansion of female-owned businesses may have a particularly strong impact on female employment because the female employment rates are higher in the firms owned by women, as the findings of the World Bank *Enterprise Surveys* demonstrate (Sattar 2012).

Industrial and occupational segregation

Industrial and occupational segregation by gender is a typical feature of labour markets and Central Asian countries are no exception. Women's employment tends to concentrate in health, education and social services, a pattern established in Central Asia during the Soviet times. For example, the proportion of women working in education and healthcare in total female employment varies from 27 percent in Tajikistan to 58 percent in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, despite the lower female employment rates, women's presence in these sectors is considerable. For example, in Tajikistan women constitute 45 percent of total employment in education and 57 percent of total employment in healthcare. In Kyrgyzstan, these proportions are even higher at 72 percent and 78 percent. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan the female shares in education are 69, 74, and 64 percent and in healthcare 78, 77, and 70 percent of wage workers.

These sectors are predominantly state-financed and women's presence in them is often connected to the prevalence of women in the public sector. Indeed, whereas the share of women in the private sector is about 45 percent of private sector employment in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, the share of women in public sector employment varies from 39 percent in Tajikistan, to 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 59 percent in Kazakhstan (UNECE database). However, even within public sector there is variation. For example, in state organizations in Tajikistan the female share is only 19.8 in the customs department although it is 55.4 percent in social assistance provisioning (Women and Men in Tajikistan 2008).

Despite their strong presence in the public sector, female share in state sector employment has decreased since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This development has been accompanied by an increase in the female presence among NGOs (Ishkanian, 2003). It also represents a duality in the nature of female involvement in the public sector in the Central Asian countries, in which, on the one hand, women are

actively involved in the civil society and, on the other hand, there is very low awareness of the importance of participating in civil society, in particular in local budget processes, among women not active in the labour force (Esenaliev and Kisunko 2015).

At the same time, women’s presence in the private sector has increased over the last two decades. This increase was in part driven by the expansion of the trade sector and the predominance of women in certain subcomponents of it, such as shuttle trading (USAID 2010). Women’s role also increased in the hotel and catering sectors. As a result, women constitute 61 and 55 percent of workers in trade, hotels and catering in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The corresponding female shares in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 45 and 34 percent (Women and Men publications).

In addition to industrial segregation patterns, vertical segregation patterns are prevalent. Indeed, women are underrepresented among decision-making positions such as legislators, senior officials and managers (Table 3). This pattern is visible even in the sectors in which women dominate, such as education and healthcare, and in the public sector. For example, whereas 48 percent of deputy directors of secondary schools are women, the female share is only 31 percent at the director level (Women and men in Uzbekistan, 2007, p.77). In Kyrgyzstan, in 2011, despite having higher skill level, only 29.1 percent of managers at state institutions, organizations and enterprises were females (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan, 2012, p.88).

On the other hand, women tend to be overrepresented in high-skilled positions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as about two thirds of professionals and technicians are females in both countries (Table 1). Reflecting their growing role in services and trade, they are also overrepresented among clerks and service workers and shop and market sales workers. They are underrepresented among plant and machine operators and assemblers. To some degree, the latter patterns are present due to the legislative constraints on the engagement of women in certain occupations and industries. For example, in none of the Central Asian countries are women allowed to work in construction, factories and mining the same way as men do. Such restrictions on women’s work have been shown to contribute to gender wage gaps (World Bank, 2015).

Table 1. Female share in each category (total employment)

	Kazakhstan (2008)	Kyrgyzstan (2006)	Kazakhstan		Kyrgyzstan	
	Female share in each category		share in female employment	share in male employment	share in female employment	share in male employment
Total	0.49	0.42	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Legislators, senior officials and managers	0.38	0.35	0.05	0.08	0.02	0.03
Professionals	0.68	0.62	0.18	0.08	0.14	0.06
Technicians and associate professionals	0.65	0.63	0.12	0.06	0.10	0.04
Clerks	0.73	0.74	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01
Service workers and shop and market sales workers	0.67	0.57	0.19	0.09	0.22	0.12
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	0.49	0.41	0.16	0.16	0.33	0.35
Craft and related trade workers	0.23	0.19	0.04	0.14	0.07	0.21
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0.11	0.03	0.02	0.16	0.00	0.11
Elementary occupations	0.48	0.46	0.20	0.21	0.08	0.07

Source: Laboursta


Education

These patterns of industrial segregation emerge as a result of the gender specialization of women at the tertiary education level, itself a vestige of the Soviet legacy. At the primary level, school enrollment rates have been generally high among boys and girls, according to the World Bank data (Figure 11). However, other sources reveal the emergence of worrisome gaps favoring boys already at the primary level. For example, in 2006, the gross enrollment rate was 95.1 percent for boys but only 88.5 percent for girls in Kazakhstan (van Klaveren et al. 2010). The enrollment rates drop with age, and more so among girls than boys. In Tajikistan, the boy to girl ratio increases from 99 for 10 year old to 120 for 16 year olds. By 21 years of age, the enrollment rate of boys is 17 percent and for girls it is only 5.2 percent. The gender gap is especially wide in rural areas. It is also wider among children from affluent families because boys from well-off households are more likely to stay in school compared to girls whereas in poor households enrollment rates drop with age for both boys and girls (REFERENCE). Evidence indicates that military conflicts may have also played a role contributing to the widening of the gender gap in enrollment rates. For example, Shemyakina (2011) finds that the Civil War in Tajikistan led to a decline in the educational attainment of girls. Re-emergence of traditional norms may too have been a factor. Despite these differences in the educational attainment and the worsening sex ratio, however, there is no evidence that girls are discriminated against boys in consumption expenditures (Pena 2012).

It is notable that, according to the test results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) girls tend to outperform boys in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with the magnitude of the gap being smaller in mathematics and larger in reading and science. However, the gap varies across the performance distribution: it is large favoring girls at the lower end and either disappears or favors boys among the top-performing children, especially in mathematics (Stoet and Geary 2015). Stoet and Geary (2015) argue that, if it is the case that top-performing children are more likely to achieve positions of power,

the relatively stronger performance of boys at the top of the distribution can play a role in perpetuating male dominance in the public and private spheres.

Figure 11. Trends in the Ratio of Female-to-Male Enrollment



At the tertiary level, women currently represent the majority of students in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, similar to other countries of the former Soviet Union. The increase in the female to male enrollment ratio has been particularly sharp in Kyrgyzstan, as the ratio increased from parity at 101.4 percent to 161.3 between 2000 and 2013. Complementing this observation, Brück and Esenaliev (2013) find that, compared to older cohorts, young women in Kyrgyzstan are more likely to obtain higher levels of education than their parents.

Unlike the rest of the former Soviet Union, in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, it is young men who represent the majority of students at the tertiary level. Although in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the ratio of female to male enrollment remains well below 1, it has moved closer to parity in the recent years. In Tajikistan, it increased from 44.8 to 61 percent between 2000 and 2014 (World Bank). In Turkmenistan it went up from 47 percent during 2000-2009 to 64 percent in 2014 (ILO 2010; World Bank). However, in Uzbekistan, it fell sharply from 83.9 to 64.7 percent between 2000 and 2011, a worrisome development. Hence, there is considerable variation in the changes in the female to male enrollment ratio, highlighting the importance of understanding country-specific context.

Importantly, the variation in the presence of females in different specializations at the tertiary level largely mirrors industrial and occupational segregation patterns. The importance of this fact is underscored

by the well-established finding that gender differences in the fields of study translate into gender differences in labour market outcomes in the form of industrial segregation and gender wage gaps (Flabbi 2011). The patterns in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are similar to what is observed in other transition countries. Women are concentrated in education and healthcare subjects, as well as economics and social sciences, and underrepresented in agriculture and engineering. For example, in Kazakhstan, about 80 percent of graduates in education and healthcare are female (Women and Men publications). In Kyrgyzstan, these percentages are 80 and 66 (Women and Men). In Uzbekistan, the female share of graduates in education is about 60 percent, in healthcare it is about 50 percent, and in economics and social sciences it is only 24 percent (these shares have been decreasing in Uzbekistan). On the other hand, in Tajikistan, women constitute only 39 percent of graduates in education, about 30 percent of graduates in healthcare, and only 24 percent of graduates in economics and social sciences⁹ (Women and Men in Tajikistan).

A pressing labour market challenge in the Central Asian region is in low youth labour force participation (Figure 3) and high youth unemployment rates. In this context, facilitating school to work transition is key. In Kyrgyzstan, young men are more likely to complete the school to work transition whereas young women are more likely to withdraw from school and from the labour force right after graduating to start families and take care of their households (Elder et al. 2015). Over 40 percent of employed youth works as contributing family workers primarily in agriculture, with higher shares among young women than young men, much higher than the 8.9 percent among working age men and 19.1 percent among working age women (Figure 6). In addition, more young workers are engaged in irregular than in “regular” work, i.e. work for pay with a contract of at least one year in Kyrgyzstan with sharp gender differences. In fact, only 14.3 percent of young women as opposed to 25.4 percent of young men are employed in regular work, the largest gap among the former Soviet Union countries (Elder et al. 2015). Moreover, proportionately more women work fewer hours: 64.6 percent of men compared to 50.6 percent of women work more than 30 hours. Finally, a larger proportion of young women than men are neither employed nor in education or training (NEET): 7.5 percent of young men and 22.7 percent of young women, the second largest gap after Armenia (Elder et al. 2015). These patterns present a picture of a highly underutilized young generation, in which labour-market-related gender gaps are perpetuated.

⁹ Refers to the proportion of currently enrolled students.

Pay gaps

The patterns of industrial and occupational segregation by gender and gender specialization in tertiary education have contributed to the presence of gender wage gaps¹⁰ in Central Asian countries. There is considerable variation in the estimates depending on the earnings measure and the data source. For example, the gap is the highest in Tajikistan at 50.9 percent in 2013 using the UNECE database (Table 2). However, for the same year, its value is 46 percent when using the gender earned income gap (WEF 2014). The wage gap in Tajikistan declined over the last two decades however, once again, the estimates vary. According to Johnes (2002), it contracted from 55 percent to about 51 percent between 1999 and 2003. The UNECE database suggests that it decreased further to 38.7 percent in 2008, before increasing to 50.9 percent by 2011 (UNECE data). However, the 2003 value of 51 percent in Johnes (2002) is substantially higher than the value of 27.2 percent reported in the UNECE dataset (Figure 12).

Table 2. Gender Pay Gap and Gender Earned Income Gap

	Gender Pay Gap (UNECE data; most recent year)	Gender Earned Income Gap (WEF 2014)	Wage Equality for Similar Work, F/M ratio (WEF, 2014)
Kazakhstan	6.8	42	.71
Kyrgyz Republic	26.7 ¹	46	.72
Tajikistan	50.9 ²	37	.71
Turkmenistan		33	
Uzbekistan		34	

Notes:¹ 2012; ² 2013; ³ 2011

Kazakhstan stands out in the UNECE dataset as a country with a very low and declining gender wage gap that reached 6.8 percent in 2012 (Figure 12, UNECE data). However, once again, there is variation depending on the sources, as other studies find that the gender gap in monthly wages decreased from 39.3 to 31.4 percent between 2003 and 2008 (van Klaveren et al. 2010) and that it remains above 30 percent (Men and Women in Kazakhstan, 2011). Using hourly wages the gap was 47.8 percent in 2003 (Staneva et al. 2010) and 19.4 percent in 2009 (Blunch 2010). Taken together, the cumulative evidence points to gender wage gaps in Kazakhstan of well above the 6.8 percent in 2012 reported in the UNECE database.

On the other hand, the relatively stable gap observed in Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2010 is confirmed by several sources (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan 2012; UNECE database; WECF 2014). The gap

¹⁰ We define the gender pay gap as the difference between men's and women's average earnings from employment expressed as a percentage of men's average earnings.


increased from 32.4 percent in 2000 to 36.4 percent in 2010, after which it sharply dropped. More recent evidence from Kyrgyzstan from 2013 points to the further lowering of the gender earnings gap (including self-employed workers) to about 19 percent (Anderson et al. 2015).

There is paucity of data on wage gaps in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Data based on a survey of Turkmen self-employed individuals, which includes small business employers and own account workers, indicates that the income gap among own-account workers is about 36 percent (UNDP 2008). On the other hand, among small business owners, women’s earnings are 30 percent more than men’s earnings.

It is notable that the gender wage gap appears to be smaller among young workers. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the gap among young wage and salaried workers is 23 percent (Baumann et al. 2013) and negligible among youth (Elder et al. 2015). Hence, even though labour-market-related gender gaps among young workers remain substantial, there might be some indications of changing gender dynamics.

In Kazakhstan, the gap appears to be narrower at small enterprises than at large enterprises, 66.3 percent versus 89.8 percent, which is mainly explained by men’s wages in small enterprises being substantially lower than in large and medium enterprises. In addition, there are large regional differences in the magnitude of the gap from 15.6 percent in North Kazakhstan to 50 percent in Mangistauskaya region (Men and Women in Kazakhstan, 2011). Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the gap varies from 26.6 percent in Bishkek to 47 percent in Jalal Abad in 2010 (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan 2012).

Figure 12. Gender Pay Gap



Gender wage gaps also vary by industry or occupation. For example, in Kazakhstan the gap varies from 59 percent in accommodation and food services to 91 percent in education. For the Central Asian region as a whole, gender wage gaps can be partly attributed to industrial segregation by gender; in Kazakhstan it indeed contributes to the gender wage gap (Van Klaveren et al. 2010). Among other factors,

UNDP (2008) attributes the gender gap among entrepreneurs in Turkmenistan to different industries in which men and women operate. Consistent with gender differences in human capital and industrial and occupational segregation, in Tajikistan gender differences in endowments widen the gap. On the other hand, in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the greater proportion of women with tertiary education has a contracting influence on the gap. In fact, in Kazakhstan, gender differences in endowments (e.g., industry, occupation, education, and experience) jointly reduce the gender wage gap (Blunch 2010) and occupational segregation does not contribute to it (Van Klaveren et al. 2010), in contrast to other Central Asian countries.

In Kyrgyzstan, differences in education, experience, ethnicity and location contributed to the gender wage gap during the 1990s (Anderson and Pomfret (2003). In 2013, additional contributing factors widening the gap among wage workers and self-employed individuals are a higher proportion of self-employed men and men's greater preference for risk-taking. Beyond the analysis of the gap at the mean of the distribution, the gender wage gap is the highest at the right tail of the distribution, potentially indicative of the glass ceiling effect (Anderson et al. 2015).

Despite considerable variations in the gender wage gaps and their trends, the common finding is that the majority of the gap in Central Asian countries is unexplained, arguably due to discrimination in the labour markets (Anderson et al. 2015; Anderson and Pomfret 2003; Sattar 2012).

There are several important caveats that must be taken into account when interpreting the evidence on the gender earnings gaps. For example, gender gaps in monthly earnings are a common measure of gender pay gap. However, this measure can overestimate the magnitude of the gap to the extent that women work fewer hours (Brainerd 1998). Moreover, gender pay gaps are commonly measured using wage income of employees. As such, the analysis of gender pay gaps provide only a partial picture of the gender earnings gaps in countries in which wage employment is not the dominant form of employment, as is the case for most Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan). Furthermore, agriculture plays a sizable role in employment, employing more than a quarter of the workforce, and its role is especially large in self-employment, for which the measurement of income is particularly problematic.

Unpaid work and care

One factor that has played a role in influencing women's ability to engage in labour markets as wage workers and entrepreneurs is unpaid work constraints. Similar to other countries in the world, women in Central Asia carry most of the burden of domestic and care responsibilities. This is clearly demonstrated by time use surveys, which shed light on the gender distribution of unpaid and paid work time. Women spend

between 1.5 and 4 times as much time as men on unpaid work, with the gap being the lowest in Kazakhstan and highest in Uzbekistan (Table 3). On the other hand, men spend more time than women on paid work and the gender gap in paid work time is similar across the Central Asian region. As a result, in total, women and men in Kazakhstan spend about the same amount of time working in paid and unpaid activities, whereas in Kyrgyzstan, women spend between 10 and 20 percent more time working than men, higher than the OECD average of five percent.

Table 3. Paid and Unpaid Work Time, Daily Hours

Time Use	Men	Women	FM Ratio
<i>Paid work and study</i>			
Kyrgyz Republic (2005)	6	4	0.67
Kyrgyz Republic (2010)	5	3.6	0.72
Kyrgyz Republic (2010) only employed and only paid work (p.85)	5.1	4.6	
Kazakhstan (2006)	5	3	0.60
Tajikistan (2003)		3	
OECD 28	5.5	3.6	0.65
<i>Unpaid work</i>			
Kyrgyz Republic (2005)	2	5	2.5
Kyrgyz Republic (2010)	2.2	4.8	2.2
Kazakhstan (2006)	4	6	1.5
Tajikistan (2003)		11.2	
Tajikistan (2007)		4.6	
Uzbekistan (2006)	1.02	3.98	3.9
OECD 28	2.3	4.6	2.0
<i>Childcare, main activity</i>			
Kyrgyz Republic (2010)	0.6	1.4	2.3
Uzbekistan (2006) [care]	0.37	0.98	2.6
<i>Total work</i>			
Kyrgyz Republic (2005)	8	9	1.1
Kyrgyz Republic (2010)	7.2	8.4	1.2
Kazakhstan (2006)	9	9	1
Tajikistan (2003)		14.2	
OECD 28	7.8	8.2	1.05

Note: These values correspond to average time spent on activities, which is the product of the participation rate and the average time spent by those undertaking the activity.

Sources: OECD 2011b; Tajikistan: Meurs and Slavchevska (2014) for 2003 and Women and Men in Tajikistan (2011) for 2007; Kyrgyzstan: Women and Men in Kyrgyz Republic (2011, p.120), includes Off-work time/hours related to a job, unpaid work includes Work on small holdings, summer cottage, garden; Uzbekistan: Women and Men of Uzbekistan (2007).

Perhaps not surprisingly, rural men and women spend more time on unpaid work activities than their urban counterparts (except for Kazakhstan) but gender gaps in rural areas are lower (Table 6; Meurs and Slavchevska 2014). This finding does not necessarily imply a more equal sharing of household responsibilities in rural areas but rather may be a reflection of the greater degree of gender specialization in unpaid work activities (Walker et al. 2014). Women tend to spend more time on cooking, cleaning and care whereas men engage in house and property maintenance.

Rural women in Tajikistan spend less time on childcare than their urban counterparts, unlike what we observe for other domestic responsibilities (Table 4). This may be because poor infrastructure constrains their non-care related time use (hence they spend more time on non-care activities), but, as a result, their care time suffers (Meurs and Slavchevska 2014). Yet, in Kyrgyzstan and, to some extent, in Uzbekistan rural women spend more time on childcare. Urban/rural comparisons in childcare have to be made with caution especially when made using primary childcare time. This is because the share of secondary childcare (i.e., childcare that takes place while parents are primarily involved in other activities) may be higher in rural areas if mothers are engaged in activities, such as tending to a garden plot, which better allow for supervisory childcare (Short, et al. 2002). Evidence from other countries also suggests that parents in rural areas spend less time on child enrichment and educational activities than their urban counterparts, potentially affecting their children’s development outcomes (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 2014).

Table 4. Rural/Urban Breakdown of Time Use, Daily Hours

	rural			urban		
	Men	Women	FM ratio	Men	Women	FM ratio
Kazakhstan						
Kazakhstan (2005) GWANET						
Paid work, no study	4.6	3.9	0.85			
Unpaid work, including care	1.3	2.9	2.23			
Care	0.2	0.95	4.75			
Total	5.95	6.8	1.13			
Kyrgyzstan						
Kyrgyzstan (2010)						
Paid work and study	4.2	2.8	0.7	5.7	4.1	0.7
Only paid work, only employed (p.85)	4.6	4.0	0.9	6.1	5.8	0.95
Unpaid work, including care	3.0	5.5	1.8	1.6	4.3	2.7
Care	0.8	1.9	2.0	0.5	1.1	2.2
Total	7.2	8.3	1.2	7.3	8.4	1.2
Kyrgyzstan (2005)						


Paid work, no study	3.3	1.52	0.46			
Unpaid work, including care	2.3	4.97	2.16			
Care	0.1	.89	8.90			
Total	5.6	6.5	1.16			
Tajikistan						
Tajikistan (2003)						
Paid work (employment, excluding subsistence agriculture)		3.5		1.8		
Unpaid work (housework only)		5.5		6.5		
Care		4.0		5.8		
Total		9		8.3		
Tajikistan (2007)						
Unpaid work (housework, including care)		4.6		4.6		
Care		0.9		1.6		
Tajikistan (GWANET, 2005)						
Paid work (no study)	4.8	1.9	0.40			
Unpaid work, including care	1.6	5.3	3.31			
Care	0.01	2.0	200			
Total	6.4	7.2	1.1			
Turkmenistan						
Turkmenistan (2005) GWANET						
Paid work (including domestic plots)	5.7	3.2	0.56			
Unpaid work, including care	0.8	4.9	6.15			
Care	0.1	1.35	13.1			
Total	6.5	8.1	1.3			
Uzbekistan						
Uzbekistan (2006)						
Unpaid work, including care	0.95	4.02	4.2	1.1	3.93	3.6
Care	0.37	1.00	2.7	0.37	0.93	2.5

Sources: Tajikistan: Meurs and Slavchesvka (2014) for 2003, GWANET (2005) for 2005, Women and Men in Tajikistan (2011) for 2007; Kyrgyzstan: Women and Men in Kyrgyz Republic (2011, p.120); Kazakhstan: GWANET 2005; Kyrgyzstan: GWANET for 2005 and workshop presentation for 2010; Turkmenistan: GWANET survey for 2005; Uzbekistan: Women and Men of Uzbekistan (2007); GWANET surveys were conducted in selected rural areas and are not representative of rural populations in these countries.

The extent to which care and domestic responsibilities constrain women's engagement in employment and entrepreneurship in the countries of the Central Asian region needs a careful assessment. The available evidence from the Central Asian region reveals that the share of inactive women who report domestic responsibilities as the primary reason for their inactivity varies from 11 percent in Kazakhstan to 60.5 percent in Tajikistan (Figure 13). On the other hand, except for Tajikistan, this share is negligible for men. Even once employed, women continue facing the constraint of domestic and care responsibilities,

evidenced in the number of lost working days due to temporary disability, such as taking care of sick children, being substantially higher for women than for men in Tajikistan (Maltseva 2007).


Figure 13. Share of Inactive Population due to Domestic Responsibilities.



source: Falkingham and Baschieri (2004) and UNECE database, for 2012

Evidence also indicates that the participation of females with children in labour markets depends on the available social infrastructure and on the affordability of market substitutes. For example, OECD (2012) finds that the “lack of support for motherhood is hurting women’s career prospects, despite gains in education and employment” and “[c]ountries with the smallest gender gap in unpaid work are those which have the highest female employment rates” (OECD 2012). One way of interpreting this finding is that by alleviating women’s responsibilities and reducing the gap in unpaid work, social infrastructure may be contributing to raising women’s employment rates. Indeed, there appears to be a positive relationship between the female labour force participation and the availability of childcare in Central Asia. For example, a steady increase in pre-school enrollment rates for children under three from the low of 4.5 percent during 2001-2002 school year to 15 percent in 2012-2013 in Kazakhstan has been associated with an increase in the female labour force participation rate. Nevertheless, this relationship is not clear-cut. In fact, Turkmenistan stands out as a country with some of the lowest labour force participation rates in the region but some of the highest enrollment rates for pre-school children (Figure 14).

Figure 14. School Enrollment Rates, by Age



source: UNECE database, latest available year since 2007

There is regional variation in the coverage. For example, in Kazakhstan, whereas the overall coverage rate for 1-6 year-olds was 26 percent in 2010, it was only 7.6 percent in Almatinskaya region and as high as 54.4 percent in Pavlodarskaya region (Women and Men in Kazakhstan, 2011, p.64).

In Kyrgyzstan, the coverage of 1-6 year-olds in 2010 was 14.5 percent and was higher in urban areas at 29.9 percent and under eight percent in rural areas (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan, 2011). The latter finding may appear to contradict the lower female labour force participation of women in urban areas. However, the lack of social infrastructure in rural areas is less likely to negatively influence female involvement in the labour market. This is because agricultural self-employment, which is a dominant form of employment in rural areas, may allow women to combine work with supervisory childcare, something that may not be possible with the more dominant wage work in urban areas (Short et al. 2002). Nevertheless, women in rural areas feel that improvements in social care infrastructure and the “creation of kindergartens would create more opportunities for them” (WECF 2014a).

Indeed, a comprehensive review of policies aimed at raising women’s economic empowerment finds that programs providing access to affordable and reliable childcare, childcare subsidies, and public childcare provisioning are an effective approach for improving women’s labour market outcomes and earnings in developing and transition economies (Buvinić et al. 2013). Evidence is also supportive of the employment-increasing impact of publicly provided pre-school programs (Haeck et al. 2015). Such programmes have the additional benefit of direct employment creation and the accompanying increase in the demand for supporting jobs. İlkkaracan et al. (2015) and Antonopoulos and Kim (2011) investigate the

direct and indirect effects of social care sector expansion and find that it supports decent employment creation, generates pro-women job allocation, and reduces poverty. The effect of childcare provisioning is positive not only on paid female employment, but also on female entrepreneurship, as it allows women to expand their businesses and hence address the small size constraint, which is one of the main reasons for the weaker performance of female-owned businesses (Johnson 2005). Therefore, policies supporting the development of the childcare support network can play a considerable role in increasing female wage employment and entrepreneurship.

Migration

A crucial coping strategy for dealing with the lack of income-earning opportunities, migration has fundamentally shifted the labour market landscape of Central Asia countries and affected its gender balance. Initially, the collapse of the Soviet Union was associated with the movement of ethnic Russians out of Central Asia and forced migration triggered by military conflicts. But over the last two decades, labour migration has become the main form of migration, with the Russian Federation the main recipient country, followed by Kazakhstan. These flows can be explained by growing populations combined with limited employment opportunities in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and contracting populations together with labour shortages in some sectors of the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. Within countries, regions with higher poverty tend to have higher migration rates, further underscoring the push nature of migration. Net migration from Kazakhstan is relatively small because of large migrant in-flows from other Central Asia countries. The net migration rate in 2009 was 3.3 per 1,000 of population (55,000 out-migrating) (van Klaveren, et al. 2010). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan, by some estimates, 7-8 percent of the labour force are migrants working abroad. In Kyrgyzstan, 14 percent of households in 2007 had at least one migrant household member, primarily in the southern part of the country. In Tajikistan, 37 percent of households had at least one migrant member, with 98 percent of migrants working in the Russian Federation (Golunov, 2008). As a result, remittance flows have become a lifeline sustaining domestic economies, a fact that became all too visible during the 2008 financial crisis, during which remittance flows dwindled, worsening the recession. The current volume of remittances remains considerable, at 49 percent of GDP in Tajikistan, about 29 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 13 percent in Tajikistan (Anichkova 2012).¹¹

Labour migration from Central Asia has been primarily viewed as a male phenomenon, due to the nature of demand in host countries and the dominant “male breadwinner” family model in Central Asia. For

¹¹ Data for Turkmenistan is unavailable.

example, about 40 percent of migrant workers in Russia were employed in construction in 2007, followed by 19 percent in trade, and 14 percent in agriculture and food processing (Russian Federal Migration Service). As a result, by some estimates, 95.3 percent of migrants from Tajikistan to Russia are male (Golunov, 2008; Abdulloev et al. 2014). Of Tajik migrants to Russia and Kazakhstan, 88 percent are men, often seasonal workers leaving in the spring and returning in the winter, and the majority of Kyrgyz migrants are men (WECF 2014), although official estimates for 2010 indicate that 49.6 of migrants were women (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan, 2012, p.56).

Indeed there are reasons to believe that the female shares in total stock of migrants are underestimated. For example, official estimates suggest that women comprise 14 percent of migrant flows in Russia (Federal Migration Service of Russia), but other sources put the figure closer to 30 percent (Tyuryukanova 2011). This is in part because women are often employed informally without official contracts. For example, whereas migrant Tajik women in Russia are more likely to register than men (83.3 percent versus 74.7 percent), they are less likely to engage in employment with a written contract (73.3 percent of females do not have a contract, compared to 25.6 percent of men) (ILO 2010). Women are also more likely to be victims of human trafficking, remaining largely invisible in official statistics.

In addition, recent trends show the increased feminization of migrant flows due to rising demand for service-sector jobs and a relative drop in construction employment. In particular, the demand for domestic and care workers increased, many of whom are undocumented. For example, the share of migrant domestic workers with valid migration cards was 61 percent in Russia and only 42 percent in Kazakhstan. The overwhelming majority of domestic workers are women – 90 percent in Russia and 74 percent in Kazakhstan (Karachurina et al. 2014), and includes both internal and foreign migrants.

The 2008 crisis also contributed to the rise in the proportion of female migrants, possibly as a way of diversifying income sources. In particular, as remittance flows to Tajikistan fell by 30 percent, the share of women among Tajik migrants almost doubled from 6.61 percent in 2007 to 13.01 percent in 2009 (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010). Therefore, different analytical tools are needed to better capture their situation (UNIFEM 2009).

A large proportion of migrants from Central Asia are engaged in unskilled occupations, in part explained by the nature of labour demand in recipient countries and the skills composition of migrants due to the push nature of migration. Whereas migration and informal sector activities are substitutes, professional workers are more likely to choose informal activities and low-skilled workers are more likely to choose migration (Abdulloev et al. 2012). Furthermore, even though many female migrants have higher or vocational education, they are employed in low-skilled occupations because their skills do not match the

demand in the destination country (UNIFEM, 2009). Indeed, domestic workers are among the most educated labour migrants in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (Karachurina et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the proportion of migrants with tertiary education dropped from 21 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2011 (EDB and UNDP 2015). At the same time, there appear to be particular niches in high-skilled occupations that migrants have successfully entered. For example, labour migrants from Kazakhstan tend to be high-skilled workers, many of whom work in the manufacturing sector in Siberia (Golunov, 2008). Kyrgyz doctors have increasingly migrated to Russia in search of better earnings opportunities (Mambetalieva, 2007).

Although migration has been a coping response to poor labour market environment, it has in turn profoundly affected labour markets in Central Asian countries. For example, migrant remittances in Tajikistan increase the probability of men engaging in self-employment as opposed to wage employment, without any impact on female employment, potentially implying that men are better able to capitalize on remittances than women (Piracha et al. 2013). Men's labour force participation rates also decrease as a result of international migration, reducing the gender gap in labour force participation (Abdulloev et al. 2014). Remittances can also affect the labour hours of working age men and women in Tajikistan, with the negative effect being stronger for men than for women (Justino and Shemyakina 2012).

Women also pick up a greater portion of the household responsibilities previously carried out by the migrant household member (as evidence from Moldova suggests, Görlich et al. 2007). Due to migration, women in Central Asia take on tasks such as "fieldworks, animal care, children upbringing, and household chores" (WECF 2014a) and women in households abandoned by migrants are more involved in unpaid work activities than other women (OSCE 2012).

Migration has had complex implications for the individual and household well-being. On the one hand, it has played a substantial role in reducing poverty. For example, migrant remittances have reduced poverty rates in the Kyrgyz Republic by 6-7 percentage points (UNDP 2015) and played a positive role in child growth in Tajikistan by improving the nutritional intake of households (Azzari and Zezza 2011). In Tajikistan women in households with migrants achieve higher levels of education attainment (Abdulloev et al. 2014). Hence, without migration the gender gap in Tajikistan's labour force participation rate would have been even higher.


However, migration has also had disruptive effects on family life, with asymmetric gender impact on migrants and family members who stay behind. Between 230,000 and 288,000 households in Tajikistan can be considered economically abandoned and live at or below the poverty line, and more than 70 percent of them consist of married women with children (OSCE 2012). Up to 30 percent of married migrant men from Tajikistan do not return home (IOM 2009). The majority of abandoned women report being

worse off as a result of their spouses' migration and are twice as financially vulnerable as other women (OSCE 2012). Even in households that economically benefit from migration, children's psychological well-being has been affected by the absence of a parent (UNICEF 2011).

Agency

Underlying these gender inequalities in labour markets are social norms and traditions. Norms on female role in the household and male role as breadwinners affect women and men's labour market participation choices, the types of jobs they seek, and their ability to establish and run firms. For example, more than half of men and more than a third of women believe that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (Figure 15). Close to a third or more of men and women believe that if a woman earns more than her husband this may cause marital strife; close to half or more of men and women believe that men make better business executives. These proportions are substantially higher in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and, notably, women tend to hold less conservative views than men.

Figure 15. Gender Norms with Respect to Engagement in Labour Markets.




Such attitudes towards gender roles in society are bound to influence men and women's labour market choices as workers and entrepreneurs, potentially reinforcing gender inequalities. They can also hinder or facilitate the implementation of policies aimed at reducing them. For example, household-based analyses of poverty often overlook gender asymmetries in resource allocation within households. Using the

case of Tajikistan, Falkingham and Baschieri (2009) demonstrate that, if traditions allow men to retain even a portion of their wage income, gender gaps in poverty rates widen: a 20 percent retention of men’s wage income results in women experiencing a poverty rate 10 percentage points higher than that of men.

Dynamics of household decision making have other gendered outcomes, too. For example, in many Central Asian societies, the eldest woman in the household plays an important role in influencing healthcare services that expectant mothers receive. Therefore, policies aimed at improving maternal health outcomes must target not only pregnant women but their households as well. Changing gender dynamics will require a comprehensive approach involving initiatives targeting not only women but other members of society (Meurs and Giddings 2012).

Effecting such change will also require strong political will and greater female involvement in public life. As already indicated, women have been active participants in the non-governmental sector of Central Asian societies, taking on causes such as maternal healthcare, business training, and climate change (Ishkanian, 2003). But implementing these changes will necessitate greater female participation in the political process, which women have eschewed in part due to social norms, as politics are viewed to be “men’s work” and corrupt (Ishkanian, 2003). Most people also believe that men make better political leaders than women – for example, about 70 percent of men and 58 percent of women hold this view in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, consistent with other observed patterns, these proportions are even higher, 82 percent of men and 72 percent of women subscribing to this view (Figure 16).


Figure 16 Percentage that agree that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do



source: World Values Survey

As a result, although no legal restrictions exist, during 2000-2014 the proportion of seats held by women in parliaments was below the average for the Europe and Central Asia region (Figure 17). However, this figure increased and, by 2014, in two out of five countries, is at or above the ECA average.

Figure 17. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments.




At the ministerial level, the proportion of women is considerably below the ECA average. However, similar to female parliamentarians, the proportion of female ministers has increased in all countries of Central Asia (Figure 18). In state structures, the types of positions that men and women hold vary.

For example, in 2011, in Kyrgyzstan, the female share of civil servants in the state sector was a respectable 39.8 percent. But 40.6 percent of these women were in administrative positions and only 25.5 percent in political and special positions (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan, 2012). At the municipal level, the female share is 33.1 percent – with only 4.2 percent of women in political municipal positions and 34.8 percent in administrative municipal positions. Out of 48 ministries and agencies, 26 had no women in political and special positions (Women and Men in Kyrgyzstan, 2012, p.105).

In Tajikistan, in 2008, out of 23 ministries and agencies, the female share in supervisory/managerial positions was less than 10 percent in 11 of them and 5 had no women at all. [PROGRESS IN KAZAKHSTAN tbd]

Figure 18. Proportion of women in ministerial level positions (%)



Social protection systems

Gender inequalities in labour markets are integrally connected with gender differences in access to social protection systems. The large informal shares of the economies of Central Asia coupled with strong migration outflows have put considerable strain on contributory pension schemes and have contributed to large parts of the population not being covered by social protection schemes. In fact, the coverage of social assistance and social insurance programmes has been limited compared to other countries of the former Soviet Union. It is the highest in Kazakhstan, with 31 percent of population covered by social assistance programmes and 28 percent covered by social insurance programmes (e.g. pensions). However, in Kyrgyzstan, these proportions are only 8.5 percent and 30.5 percent, and in Tajikistan, they are 10 percent and 34 percent, respectively. In addition to the large size of the informal sector, the low coverage is also due to agricultural workers in *dehkans* being outside of the social protection system (HelpAge International, 2016). Furthermore, the poverty and inequality-reducing impact of social assistance and social insurance programmes in Kazakhstan and especially in Tajikistan has been small. The small impact in Tajikistan has been attributed to both inadequate resources and poor targeting (World Bank 2014b). On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan achieved a modest 41 percent reduction in the poverty headcount ratio from social insurance schemes (World Bank Aspire database).

Migration remittances have buffered the poor state of social protection infrastructure, as have traditional informal safety nets, such as *mahalla*. However, these arrangements must not serve as a

substitute for a formal social protection system whose mandate is to ensure effective and targeted coverage.

This paper has demonstrated that women and men in Central Asia face different constraints in accessing and utilizing resources and in participating in labour markets. In particular, their pensions are affected by their lower labour force participation rates, involvement in low-remunerated service industries, and high rates of self-employment in agriculture as contributing family workers. Furthermore, limited childcare provisioning in Central Asian countries may be another contributing factors, preventing women from participating in formal wage employment and further limiting women's access to social protection (FAO 2015). Therefore, the design and implementation of social protection programmes should acknowledge these constraints.

Conclusions

This paper has demonstrated that gender inequalities in labour markets remain pervasive and, in some cases, have worsened in Central Asian economies. Proportionately fewer women participate in labour markets and they are more likely to engage in precarious forms of employment. In countries with a high share of agricultural employment, women are over-represented as contributing family workers. They are also substantially less likely to be entrepreneurs and to hold land titles. They face greater barriers in accessing credit and have weaker networks. Migration in Central Asia has been a male phenomenon, although recent evidence points towards its increased feminization.

Reducing these gender inequalities must become a priority for all countries in the region if they are to achieve inclusive growth, human development and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. The achievement of these goals will require a comprehensive evidence-based strategy that expands human choices and capabilities by complementing supply-side interventions with demand-side measures aimed at creating equitable and gainful employment opportunities. Indeed, active measures to enhance women's economic empowerment should be of central concern to the policy dialogue aimed at inclusive growth and poverty and inequality reduction (Çagatay 1998). Such a strategy should include the following elements:

- 1. Remove legal and regulatory barriers to women's economic empowerment:** although substantial progress has been made, pervasive gender-based occupational restrictions remain, preventing women from engaging in employment and entrepreneurship (SDG 10).
- 2. Place labour migration and remittances, and their gendered implications at the center of the national policy making agenda** (SDGs 5, 8, 10, and 17).

- 3. Implement policies to address women’s care and domestic responsibilities to promote decent employment opportunities, increase productivity and earnings:** reducing women’s burden of unpaid care to promote their participation in the labour market and in entrepreneurship has to be an integral part of a strategy to reduce gender inequality (SDGs 5, 8).
- 4. Strengthen national capacities to generate and use sex- and age-disaggregated data for gender analysis:** this is necessary to design gender-responsive macro-economic and social policy and programmes. It is particularly important to address the gaps on data on time use. National statistical agencies must improve data collection to allow full mainstreaming of gender in macroeconomic policies and make the data accessible (SDGs 5, 17).
- 5. Include a strong impact evaluation element in proposed policies:** impact evaluation elements (environmental, social and gender) need to be incorporated into policy design. Impact evaluations are key to providing new evidence-based policy frameworks for gender equality.
- 6. Improve the productivity and working conditions of agriculture and rural economy:** a large proportion of the workforce in Central Asia is employed in agriculture and in rural areas, working long and unpredictable hours, in unsafe conditions of typically low wages and productivity. Women in rural areas are proportionately more likely to be [unpaid] contributing family workers. They are also less likely to hold land titles and have limited decision-making power. Improving the agricultural productivity, wages and working conditions, and women’s access to land will be a key to changing the gender gaps in employment composition in rural areas (SDG 2).
- 7. Address gender gaps in education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels and high specialization by subjects in tertiary education:** Investments in girls’ education and nurturing a gender-balanced system of tertiary education will be vital for reducing gender-based industrial and occupational segregation (SDG 4; SDG 8).
- 8. Improve women’s access and skills for entrepreneurship:** all countries of Central Asia will benefit from efforts that promote women’s access to networking opportunities; facilitate women’s access to credit through innovative financing and to market information and training in new and digital technologies; and improve women’s skills and capacities to start and develop their businesses (SDG 8).
- 9. Rebuild social protection systems able to play a transformative role in accompanying women’s participation to the formal economy.** Community-based services may constitute the network of care providing security and well-being to people in dependent groups (children, frail

elderly, sick or disabled people). They also constitute the material basis on which equal opportunity policies are grounded. The UN's Social Protection Floor Initiative, taken within an appropriate macroeconomic and fiscal framework, is designed to improve resilience, and reduce women's inequality and exclusion.

10. Support efforts to ensure that an equitable proportion of women are elected and/or appointed to government leadership positions throughout the region.

Ensuring that women participate proportionately in the political process and in leadership positions is essential to addressing gender disparities in the region. In addition, efforts should be made to invite the participation of women in elected and/or appointed positions who reflect the demographic composition of the constituencies they serve.

11. Address and combat gender stereotypes: fostering trust in women's capabilities and building their confidence is key to gender-transformative social change. It is important to support cultural campaigns against sexist stereotypes of women as well as men to generate behavioural patterns that transcend traditional gender roles and result in a more equitable distribution of responsibilities and leadership between the sexes in the workplace, at home and in the community. Promoting women in visible positions of seniority and decision-making in public and private spheres, as well as encouraging men in traditionally female professions, are key to changing social norms and eliminating gender biases in social, economic and political spheres.

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Appendix

Table A1. Gender Inequality Index and its components, 2014

Country	Gender Inequality Index		Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education (% ages 25 and older)		Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older)	
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	Female	Male	Female	Male
	2014	2014	2013	2010/2015	2014	2005–2014	2005–2014	2013	2013
Kazakhstan	0.267	52	26	29.9	20.1	95.3	98.8	67.7	77.9
Uzbekistan	36	38.8	16.4	48.1	75.6
Kyrgyzstan	0.353	67	75	29.3	23.3	94.5	96.8	56.0	79.5
Tajikistan	0.357	69	44	42.8	15.2	95.1	91.2	58.9	77.1
Turkmenistan	61	18.0	25.8	46.9	76.9
World	0.449	—	210	47.4	21.8	54.5	65.4	50.3	76.7

Source: UNDP (2015)

Table A2. Gender Development Index (GDI) and its components, 2014.

Country	Gender Development Index	Human Development Index (HDI)		Life expectancy at birth (years)		Expected years of schooling (years)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Estimated gross national income per capita (2011 PPP \$)	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Kazakhstan	1.0015	0.7865	0.7853	74.1	64.6	15.4029	14.6539	11.3300	11.5400	15408.17	26746.30
Kyrgyzstan	0.9614	0.6379	0.6635	74.6	66.6	12.6894	12.3371	10.4802	10.5500	2122.02	3991.84
Uzbekistan	0.9451	0.6404	0.6777	71.8	65	11.2728	11.7433	9.5000	9.9000	3810.68	7341.85
Tajikistan	0.9260	0.6000	0.6479	73.2	66.2	10.4981	11.9683	9.5650	11.1904	2014.24	3016.66
Turkmenistan	69.9	61.5	10.5543	11.0472	8725.06	17551.53
World	0.9236	0.6697	0.7250	73.66637	69.45568	12.1858	12.3960	6.2084	7.8544	10296.19	18372.57

Source: UNDP (2015)